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On Getting It Right
The Voice of Gabriel Josipovici
Paul Davies
Abstract
This article focuses on some of the themes and questions at the heart of Gabriel 
Josipovici’s fictional and critical writing, most notably the idea that reading is a matter 
of participation rather than understanding. It asks what is distinctive about Josipovici’s 
relationship with other philosophically inclined critics and theorists. It offers a partic-
ipatory reading of one of his critical writings demonstrating the care with which it is 
arranged. The article concludes with a brief consideration of how other writers and 
works are brought into Josipovici’s fiction.
Keywords: continuity, experience, interruption, Gabriel Josipovici, reading, voice
Aliterary work invites the reader to experience it. How simply this is  said. Each of Gabriel Josipovici’s fictional works issues such an invi-
tation; each of his non-fictional works considers what is at stake in the 
invitation and the experience. Each of his works, he has said, whether 
fictional or non-fictional, is concerned with getting it right.1 But what 
does ‘getting it right’ mean when it is a matter of literature, of the writing 
of fictions and the writing of literary criticism? There seem to be at least 
three figures involved here: the writer, the reader, and the critic or critical 
reader. What can ‘getting it right’ mean for each of them? The writer 
can never simply be the reader, even the critical reader. And what can 
the ‘it’ be for the writer when it does not even exist before the writer 
brings it into existence? For the reader as well, there is a sense of being 
involved in the coming into existence of the work. It does not properly 
exist until it is read and experienced. What does ‘getting it right’ entail 
here? It can be reduced neither to the reader being appropriately enter-
tained nor to their capacity to recount the narrative or plot. For the critic 
or critical reader, it is not a matter of judging the work in terms of a set 
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of evaluative conventions, nor is it a matter of putting the work into the 
correct context, into a context in which the correct theory can be applied. 
The critical reader is also invited to experience the work. Criticism cannot 
protect itself from such an experience by presupposing its having already 
occurred. Each of these responses from each of the figures is unable to 
do justice to what is going on with the writing and reading of litera-
ture because each induces a scepticism about both the invitation and 
the experience. For such responses, it is as though we cannot begin to 
take literature seriously until we have broken with such simplifications. 
Josipovici asks us to recognize and to consider just how strange it is that 
such invitations and experiences are possible. What do such things tell us 
about language, about the world and ourselves, and about what we might 
ask of writers, readers and critical readers? These questions have consist-
ently informed and driven Josipovici’s work from the very beginning. 
And because he has always, also from the beginning, presented himself in 
the guise of each of the three figures (writer, reader and critic), his work 
has a distinctive feel, a threefold integrity.
A work invites the reader to experience it. Josipovici sometimes tries 
to give a sense of what is going on in such a formulation by invoking 
the notion of voice.2 In the cases that most intrigue Josipovici and that he 
seeks to show should also intrigue us, the reader discerns a distinctive 
voice in the fictional work, a voice that the writer can never hear, but 
that the writer has succeeded in releasing into the work. The voice opens 
up and tells of worlds and events, and characters. Necessarily it escapes 
both the writer and this world. Its power comes from elsewhere. In his 
non-fictional writing, Josipovici asks his readers to envisage a critical 
reading that would take that voice and that elsewhere seriously and that 
would allow it to change the way we read and think about reading, and 
even the way we live in the world with our reading and our thinking 
about reading. But to begin to appreciate what the writer is attempting 
to do in releasing this voice or in enabling this voice to escape, the reader 
must trust the writer and the voice. The reader must feel a minimal com-
panionship with the writer and the voice, however unsettling or contra-
dictory or violent it might be. This emphasizing of trust and voice I think 
explains in part the works and the writers Josipovici values, the works 
and writers to which he always returns. (It also explains in part some of 
the works and the writers he will not read.)
It is not primarily a matter of understanding the voice in the way we 
might plausibly speak of understanding a text, but rather of experiencing 
the reading (the discerning) as a participation. We are invited to notice 
the smallest details and repetitions and marks, and to comment on them, 
to question and wonder about them. And the invitation is there in even 
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the most daunting of books, the book itself. In Josipovici’s book on the 
Bible – it remains my favourite of all his books – he sympathizes with 
Paul Ricoeur’s worries about Bultmann and the endorsing of a tendency 
stretching back behind Luther to Augustine and Paul, a tendency to insist 
that the reading of the Bible must be bound by and to the intensities of a 
personal conversion.3 The authority of that reading and of the book itself 
are inseparable from the sincerity of this conviction. The danger is that 
the interpretation of the book is thereby subjectivized to such a degree 
that there seems no space for a reading that questions, a reading that 
challenges as well as a reading that acknowledges its being challenged. 
The converted subject or reader can hear nothing but the confident rep-
etition of their own conversion. There is no room for the experience of 
reading. In The Book of God, we are reminded how even the greatest events 
(the creation of Heaven and Earth) are marked by a beginning that can 
be nothing but a mark, the second letter of the Hebrew alphabet, its very 
shape blocking us from any prior or relevant before. The reader is created 
and is a part of creation, but it is also given to the reader and only to the 
reader to read and to ask about that mark and that literary beginning. 
The books (The Book of God and the Bible) are full of such details. Each 
mention is worthy of being recalled and affirmed because it can be read. 
Thanks to Josipovici, I will never forget Phalti (read chapter 10, ‘David 
and Tears’)4 or, rather, thanks to Josipovici, I experience and hear how 
the Bible asks for Phalti to be remembered.
The task seemed fairly straightforward: to join in the celebration of 
Gabriel Josipovici’s work by saying something about its relation to phi-
losophy. Straightforward, because that work has always comfortably and 
knowledgeably referred to a philosophical modernism as well as to a liter-
ary and artistic one. Josipovici admits an admiration for Kierkegaard and 
Wittgenstein, invariably linking their names to a lesson worth learning 
or to a point worth making. The critical writers on literature to whom 
Josipovici seems closest – Maurice Blanchot, say, or Walter Benjamin, 
or Roland Barthes – have either, on the one hand, explicitly let their 
thought develop in an engagement with the philosophical tradition and 
with the way that tradition has attempted to conceive of literature and its 
languages (fictive, mythic, poetic), or, on the other hand, produced essays 
and books that imply or propound a theory of literature, contributing to 
the philosophical treatment of issues such as literary meaning and inter-
pretation, of authorship and the role of the reader. And as we have seen, 
Josipovici argues, with Ricoeur, against an extreme Bultmannianism.
Would it be so difficult to derive from all of this – and we could of 
course have added further examples – a Josipovician method or mode 
of argument, a Josipovician theory? Even if it is not one he would ever 
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present or want presented in such terms, surely it must be there some-
where, assumed or implied? Let us try to unpack it, to see what it must 
contain, and to show how it can help us begin to deal with the questions 
and issues with which we began (invitation, experience, voice, trust). Yet 
one only has to hint at such a project to know that it is bound to fail and 
that this failure would be neither interesting nor worthwhile. It would 
miss almost everything that matters in Josipovici’s writing.
The discussion of Barthes and Blanchot in Josipovici’s first book (The 
World and the Book, first edition 1971, second edition 1979 was doubt-
less for many of its readers their first introduction to these names. How 
could it not have served or now not be seen to have served as a precur-
sor to the interest in literary theory that was to stretch across the next 
two decades?5 Not only Barthes, Blanchot and Benjamin, but Foucault, 
Lacan, Derrida? It is not that Josipovici has no interest in these other 
names, or that he is unwilling to cite them and their work favourably, 
and nor is it that he simply on ideological or aesthetic grounds resisted 
the institutional turn to ‘theory’. It was more, I think, that the linking of 
a writer’s proper name to a theory or to any specifiable and summarizable 
content almost inevitably withdraws that writer and their work from the 
only context that has ever really concerned Josipovici: the experience of 
reading and of coming to feel the force of certain questions, questions 
that at first seem so awkwardly out of place that they are accompanied 
by a second-order question that wonders why one would think like this 
or ask questions like this. And this experience is one that Josipovici some-
times finds in some of the writings of Blanchot and Barthes, rather than 
in Foucault, Lacan or Derrida,6 and it is one he tries to bring about in his 
own writings, even his writings on Blanchot and Barthes. Thus, instead 
of beginning with an account or a summary of Blanchot’s or Barthes’s 
views or positions, he isolates a single phrase (from Blanchot’s reading 
of Beckett, from Barthes’s reading of Camus), shares with us a sense for 
the novelty and the strangeness of the phrase, and shows how, in a never 
quite successful attempt to mitigate that strangeness, we are obliged to 
change our focus or to change the context within which we were inclined 
to situate Beckett or Camus. We seem to find ourselves at an unsettling 
distance from the work, a distance that is not that of the theorist or 
diagnostician, but one that nevertheless chimes with something in the 
work, in Beckett’s or Camus’s novel, we had never noticed before or had 
never been able to express before. Josipovici encourages us to welcome 
Blanchot and Barthes into a conversation that is trying to get something 
right about Beckett and Camus and about the reading of Beckett and 
Camus. In a sense, they are subordinated to that end, but Josipovici also 
shows in the delicacy of his introduction of their names that they too are 
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concerned with such things. They too want to get something right about 
these works. Nothing in Josipovici’s reading of Barthes on Camus (or 
elsewhere on Balzac) leads him to endorse Barthes’s famous theory of 
the death of the author, and Josipovici has no desire to write such a text 
himself. Likewise, nothing in his reading of Blanchot leads him to develop 
or even to consider the complex interweaving of literary and philosoph-
ical language that characterizes Blanchot’s later fragmentary writing and 
the reading relations with Hegel, Heidegger and Levinas that have been 
a major part of Blanchot’s work since the late 1940s. But should they?
Consider another perhaps simpler instance, one where Josipovici 
draws on Benjamin’s late text ‘Theses on the End of History’ to affirm 
a preference for dialectics over historicism. The latter is restricted to a 
form of thinking that presupposes the flow of thought, a thinking that is 
secured by the thought that history continues and that it must continue. 
The former accepts that thought is also engaged by the arrest or stop-
ping of thought, the jolt or shock that gives to thought a configuration. 
Having made the reference to the ‘Theses’, Josipovici notes that although 
Benjamin found the artistic expression and re-enactment of this shock in 
the epic theatre of Brecht, he is disinclined to follow him. ‘Brecht in his 
theoretical writings … makes it seem too easy.’7 Here, surely, we might be 
moved to protest. Is this not a sort of voluntaristic criticism that takes what 
it wants from the sources it finds most suggestive or useful? Benjamin 
himself makes no such allusion in the ‘Theses’. A couple of lines from The 
Threepenny Opera serve as an epigraph to the seventh of the numbered 
sections. But they are not there as an aid to illustrate the point about 
dialectics and configuration, an aid that we can decide to do without. 
The passage on Brecht and the gestural theatre quoted by Josipovici is 
not from the ‘Theses’. How has anything like justice or sensitivity been 
shown to Benjamin (or Brecht) here? And we might be tempted to think 
that the clear-cut voluntarism in this case should encourage us to have 
another look at the use of Barthes and Blanchot. I suspect some readers 
do respond to Josipovici in this way, but I think they are mistaken in 
doing so, or at least they are missing out on what is most distinctive in 
his work, and by his work here I mean both his critical and his fictional 
writings.
Let us take a closer look at the essay from which the Benjamin 
 reference is taken.
The essay is titled ‘Interruption and the Last Part’. It comprises six 
numbered sections with a single footnote. It is written ‘In memory of John 
Mepham’, a colleague from Sussex who is described in another essay as 
a ‘philosopher friend’.8 It is of a similar length to the ‘Theses on the End 
of History’ but its style and tone and its voices are very different. It begins 
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with a question and a single word answer (‘What is interrupted by an 
interruption? Continuity’) and a critical assertion (‘The classic novel pre-
sents us with narratives that are continuous and with narratives of con-
tinuity. Let Smollett’s Roderick Random stand for the genre’).9 Josipovici 
quotes the opening paragraph of the first chapter. But before following 
him, what about that question and answer: ‘What is interrupted by an 
interruption? Continuity’. There is a certain pleasure to be had from the 
brevity and confidence of that ‘continuity’, especially when the question 
it supposedly answers repeats and stumbles over the word it is seeking 
to clarify: interrupted, interruption. ‘What is interrupted by an interrup-
tion?’ When there is an interruption, what exactly is or has been inter-
rupted by it? It is not quite a philosophical question. It is not asking ‘What 
is interruption?’ or ‘What has to be in place for interruption to occur?’ 
It is not enquiring into the conditions of possibility of interruption. It is 
hard to think of situations where this question could be asked. And why 
would one ask it in this fashion? The interruptive repetition almost gives 
the question the form and feel of a riddle. Oh well, leave it, let’s get on 
with the Smollett. But there is nothing more to the Smollett. We read: 
‘Roderick Random appeared in 1748. Eleven years later a very differ-
ent kind of novel was launched on the English public’.10 And now we 
are presented with the opening of Sterne’s Tristram Shandy. Note already 
a crucial distinction, or rather a crucial feature of the distinction being 
made between Smollett and Sterne. The former is to ‘stand for the genre’ 
of the continuous narrative of the classic novel, the implication being 
that any number of other texts might have served Josipovici’s purpose. 
The latter is presented in its particularity, a beginning that tells of an 
interrupted beginning, the interrupted beginning of the life of Tristram 
Shandy. The first section concludes with the restating of the relevant con-
trast, Smollett’s continuity, Sterne’s interruption. That opening question 
can now be heard with a Shandyean inflection (What is interrupted by 
an interruption?) and that short sharp ‘continuity’ can only serve as an 
answer if we rescue it from the ‘genre’ of the classic novel.
The second section show us how to do this. It is not just that inter-
ruption is the problem, the thing to be explained, the bad to continuity’s 
good. Rather, if anything, the problem is continuity. It is the continuity 
of the life, of Tristram’s life, that makes the project of telling his life an 
impossibility. The time spent writing the events preceding his birth is itself 
a part of his life (more time) to be added to the life he is endeavouring 
to write. This cannot end well. The end of a life, as Kierkegaard realized, 
cannot stand as a conclusion to a life, as though it had been properly and 
rationally prepared for. Such a conclusion is always necessarily lacking 
and this is the only necessity we can know or expect. For Sterne and 
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for Tristram this is a truth that can only be expressed as an interruption. 
Hence the non-end to the novel and to Tristram’s reminiscences.
The third section of the essay turns to Benjamin, Brecht and the 
Brechtian celebration of interruption. The fourth, the longest of the essay, 
returns us to the focus on the power of continuity and the unavoidability 
of the thought that life continues. It is in this section that Josipovici brings 
in the second literary work he wants to consider, Virginia Woolf’s To the 
Lighthouse. As with Tristram Shandy, this novel is not introduced as an 
example but as a work whose voice we need to discern and to think about 
in order to get further with that opening question. I will not give the 
details of Josipovici’s interpretation, but he focuses on the way Woolf’s 
account of Lilly Briscoe contemplating the now deceased Mrs Ramsey 
as she watches Mr Ramsey and the children being rowed across the bay 
is interrupted by an account of the boy (Macalister’s boy) who is doing 
the rowing. Why this violent shift? Why this interruption? What conti-
nuity is being interrupted here with this interruption? Again, Josipovici 
recalls Kierkegaard. The absence of a conclusion requires that the author 
find another perspective, another way to move towards an ending. Lilly’s 
anguish, however well written, however tragic its intensity and descrip-
tion, cannot count as an end or an achievement. To suddenly see that 
anguish interrupted by another violent act, a body, the body of a fish con-
signed to the sea as bait and by the description of that act, is to be forced 
to think the anguish otherwise. There is necessarily something more to 
a life, namely its relentless continuity. But that continuity can never be 
satisfactorily heard in the simple continuity of Smollett and the classical 
novel, or, for Josipovici, in the Brechtian contrived discontinuities that 
would interrupt and configure it. Without the desire for continuity and 
for a meaningful end continuous with it that drives Tristram and Lilly, 
Sterne and Woolf, the novels could not enable us to experience all the 
different ways in which interruption does its work or its un-work.
The fifth section, a single paragraph, opens with a polemical and the-
oretical assertion. ‘Post-Modernism has made a fetish of interruption – 
but by that token is in danger of robbing it of its meaning and power. 
Sterne, Kierkegaard, Benjamin, and Virginia Woolf are wiser …’.11 The 
sixth and final section gives us a single sentence: ‘Yet even to talk about 
interruption is to turn it into something else and so rob it of its force’.12
Now one could imagine an author, not Gabriel Josipovici, deciding to 
begin an essay on ‘Interruption and the end part’ with this final sentence. 
It would sound well, would give off an air of paradox and profundity. But 
such a beginning could only continue by stepping back and away from its 
first sentence. It would have to begin again, and the now free-standing 
paradoxical opening sentence would be little more than an indication 
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of the author’s modesty (the admitted failure of what we are about to 
do). But so placed, it could not engage the reader in the questioning of 
interruption. It would neither intrigue nor implicate, but rather impress. 
It would, I think, for Josipovici, count as an instance of fetishization, a 
discontinuous discontinuity that can only be dealt with by being forgot-
ten. Even at the end of such an essay, the reader might not remember it. 
Yet we do remember that other opening question: ‘What is interrupted 
by an interruption?’
And one could imagine another author beginning with an angry dis-
missal of just this sort of non-productive and easy paradoxicality, perhaps 
as follows: ‘Post-Modernism has made a fetish of interruption – but by 
that token is in danger of robbing it of its meaning and power. Sterne, 
Kierkegaard, Benjamin, and Virginia Woolf are wiser …’. This would be a 
fine way to start proceedings, provocative, critical, introducing the writers 
whose wisdom you want to demonstrate. A tutor might advise a student 
to proceed along these lines. Sterne and Woolf contra the classic novel, 
with help from Kierkegaard and Benjamin. But now the essay, although 
it would have much of the content of the one Josipovici wrote, would 
keep the reader at a distance, never feeling the force of the question 
of interruption. Worse, it would encourage the reader to treat Tristram 
Shandy and To the Lighthouse as though they could also stand for a genre, 
for a type of literary writing that accepted the interruption of continu-
ity. Had the essay been written like this, it would have been a matter of 
understanding what it said about interruption and continuity rather than 
participating in the thinking itself.
Both of these rearrangements would preface the essay, either with a 
programmatic and polemic assertion or with an aestheticized paradoxical 
truth. Each would give the impression that before we begin something 
needs to be admitted or confessed. Josipovici has always been suspi-
cious of a writing – philosophical, critical or fictional – that allows itself 
the comforts of a ‘before we begin’, for that is also always a beginning, 
but one that abrogates the reader’s right to treat and read it as so. It 
effectively says that before participating in the experience of the reading 
certain things need to be understood, taken as read before the participatory 
reading can really get underway. The oddness of that riddling ‘What is 
interrupted by an interruption?’ may discourage some readers in ways 
that the polemical or aestheticized opening would not. But the experi-
ence of those who linger with that question and all that follows is much 
more engaging and thought-provoking.
The last part of a life or a novel (at least the novels that concern 
Josipovici) can never have the meaningful necessity we might wish. 
It could always have finished otherwise, ended sooner, or gone on 
22 European Judaism • Vol. 52 • No. 1 • Spring 2019
Paul Davies • On Getting It Right 
indefinitely. The last part of ‘Interruption and the Last Part’ might be read 
as that single sentence verging on paradox or performative contradiction, 
but now somehow worked for, certainly arrived at by way of a discussion 
and an engagement with a variety of works and writers. But however 
subtle Josipovici’s expositions, that sentence (that last part) will never 
simply be read as following on from them. It can never be entailed. Were 
it to follow logically, it could not say what it says. There would be no need 
for it. The last part interrupts and stands apart from what preceded it, but 
memorably and meaningfully so, just as in its own way did that opening 
question. We are asked to participate in the reading and experiencing of 
an apartness and a necessity that resists argument or summary.
There is perhaps just one more thing to add, for there is one more last 
part, an endnote. I hope you will forgive me if I cite it. ‘My comments on 
To the Lighthouse owe much to John Mepham’s wonderful essay “Figures 
of Desire: Narration and Fiction in To the Lighthouse”, in Gabriel Josipovici 
(ed.), The Modern English Novel, Open Books, 1976’.13 The reader might 
recall that the essay they have just read was written in memory of John 
Mepham, this ‘philosopher friend’. The last part of the essay, standing 
apart from it, neither continuous with it nor interrupting it, returns us to 
that italicized dedication, also read just before the opening question. But 
it also invites us to read another work, one by the remembered friend, 
and one whose citation names an earlier shared project. Everything in 
Gabriel Josipovici’s writing invites us to take these moments and deci-
sions, these reading experiences, seriously.
To close, I think I want to risk saying that the writers and works 
Gabriel Josipovici introduces into his critical writings often play a similar 
role to the writers and works he introduces into his fictional writings, 
and I can think of no one else of whom this could be said. Very few 
novelists can incorporate other works and voices as convincingly as he 
does. Perhaps Muriel Spark, as Josipovici has often demonstrated. It is 
hard to get this right, but Josipovici almost always does. His most recent 
novel, The Cemetery in Barnes,14 excels in this respect. A novel of repeti-
tions, interruptions and continuities, and of course repetitions are always 
also interruptions. The novel turns on the topic of translation and the 
character of a translator. Translation is a matter of continuity and inter-
ruption, of an interruption that functions to protect and preserve conti-
nuity and an interruption that consigns continuity to repetition. In The 
Cemetery in Barnes, translation enables the central character and the reader 
to continue. Sometimes the continuous flow of the untranslated language 
carries its own disruptions even for the capable translator. The extraordi-
nary shifts between Josipovici’s text and the translated and untranslated 
poems of du Bellay mean that those poems both do and do not belong to 
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the novel. Du Bellay’s voice, the voice of his translator, and the voice that 
tells of the life and marriages and wanderings of the translator mingle, and 
in mingling return us to a world in which we can read du Bellay just as we 
can walk along the river from Putney Bridge to Hammersmith. The novel 
is permeated by the libretto to Monteverdi’s Orfeo and by a recording of 
the opera. They too, untranslated by the translator although not untrans-
lated for the reader, comment on and accompany the events and recol-
lections in the novel. Indeed, they do so almost perfectly and in a manner 
that matches the almost perfect success of the opera itself. What fails and 
falters is Monteverdi’s finale where everything is brought to an end as 
though a conclusion, this conclusion, were possible. Josipovici’s novel 
ends elsewhere and else when, in a place and a time we have already 
been, even if we now count ourselves a little more knowledgeable.15 How 
seamlessly one moves from the events of the novel, which include the lis-
tening to the opera to the opera itself, to a sense for its achievements and 
failures that is both the character’s sense and the writer’s or the work’s 
sense, something with which the reader can engage just as we might with 
a moment in one of Josipovici’s critical writings.
But for me the finest ending remains that of The Air We Breathe. The 
novel closes with a woman asking a barman for a glass of water. ‘The 
Glass of Water’ is also the title of a poem by Wallace Stevens, a poem 
whose words, rehearsed and repeated, bring us to the end. The final four 
paragraphs read:
As she crossed the room again the evening sun touched her face for a 
moment as it came through one of the high windows.
She sat down. The sun formed a pool of light on half the little round 
table in front of her.
Two men came in, talking loudly. She looked up for a moment, then it 
was as if they had never existed. Her voice rose in her throat, it filled her 
ears. Then it was gone.
The light fell on the glass of water in front of her. Light is the lion. She 
heard the words, clear, quiet, inside her head. Light is the lion that comes 
down to drink. Yes, she thought. Light is the lion. Light is the lion that 
comes down to drink.16
It must have been sometime in the early 1980s when I and a mutual 
friend of mine and Gabriel’s, Francis Landy, had a long conversation 
about why this ending worked so well. For this is an ending, the quietest 
of endings, and it might almost be said to succeed as a conclusion. It does 
not loop back into the novel. There is repetition but it is the repetition of 
the words of another. Stevens’ words are removed from their position in 
the opening lines of the second stanza:
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Here in the centre stands the glass. Light
Is the lion that comes down to drink. There
And in that state, the glass is a pool.17
Has Stevens’ poetry become Josipovici’s prose? The woman asked for 
a glass of water, not ‘The Glass of Water’. Receiving the one, she also 
received something of and from the other, and pondering its words was 
able, finally, to assent to them, and, in the context of the novel’s conclu-
sion, perhaps to much more. The reader of the novel is invited to share 
that experience and that ‘yes’. Maurice Blanchot once called it ‘the light 
innocent yes of reading’.18
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Notes
 1. See, for example, ‘Why Write Fiction?’ in Gabriel Josipovici, The Teller and 
the Tale (Manchester: Carcanet, 2016), 213; or ‘Reading Kafka Today’, in The 
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267 (Blanchot), 275–279 (Barthes). See also the essay on Blanchot in Text and 
Voice, 62–78, and the essay on Barthes in the same volume, 114–137.
 6. Josipovici’s relation to Derrida is a complicated one, not least because, on the 
face of it, he shows no real desire to get to grips with Derrida’s writing, and 
this despite the fact that there are so many shared elements and concerns, 
biographical and critical: the moves to and from North Africa, their overdeter-
mined introductions or reintroductions to Europe and to French and English 
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universities; their changing reflections on being Jewish; the shared fascina-
tions with Kierkegaard, Kafka and Blanchot; and much more. The reader 
might want to hear in Josipovici’s appeal to the voice a deliberate retrieval 
of the term from Derrida’s attack on phonocentrism, the fantasy of the voice 
as the uniting of thought and meaning in the experience of hearing oneself 
speak, that Derrida had begun to deconstruct in his book on Husserl, La voix 
et le phénomène (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967). But Josipovici 
beats us to it. He cites that very book and that very argument, suggesting that 
we should understand his notion of ‘voice’ to mean something that resists 
the metaphysics of presence and unity (Text and Voice, 130–131). The impli-
cation is not only that Josipovici accepts Derrida’s argument but also that 
he presumes Derrida would accept his. I have already hinted at what might 
lie behind Josipovici’s refusal to go any further with Derrida, a lack of trust. 
Josipovici finds no reason to trust Derrida’s work. But there is something 
else. Josipovici often remarks on the fact that Blanchot, in addition to his 
critical work, was also a novelist, a writer of fictions, and Barthes always 
wished to write or to have written a novel. Josipovici has commented on 
those aspects of Barthes’s theoretical work that would have made it hard for 
him to risk writing the novel. Derrida, for Josipovici, never wanted to take 
such a risk, and when he did write a text (La Carte Postale [Paris: Flammarion, 
1980], The Post Card [trans, Alan Bass, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1987]), the first half of which consisted of a series of postcards sent to a lover, 
he refused to admit to their reality or fictionality. Josipovici, I suspect, will 
always distrust a writing that feels itself capable of sustaining that distance 
and of refusing that absorption into the world or into the book (the fiction).
 7. Josipovici, The Teller and the Tale, 277.
 8. Ibid., 283.





14. Gabriel Josipovici, The Cemetery in Barnes (Manchester: Carcanet, 2018)
15. I cannot resist drawing attention to one of the many tiny ways in which 
The Cemetery in Barnes invites the reader to attend to the smallest of marks 
and repetitions. Throughout the novel, almost every reference to the transla-
tor’s wife is followed by the simplest of qualifications, ‘his wife – his second 
wife –’. So, for example, ‘His stomach was his Achilles heel, his wife – his 
second wife – would interrupt’ (102). It enables the novel to perform the 
interruptions and repetitions (the repetitive interruptions) that were a key 
feature of their relationship. They also remind the reader of other references 
and repetitions. The absurdity and humour of the translator’s stomach being 
his Achilles heel might trigger a memory of an earlier reference to Achilles 
in one of du Bellay’s poems. ‘His wife – his second wife – …’ also makes the 
reader think of ‘his first wife’. (I believe there are only one or two occasions 
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when we come across ‘his wife – his first wife – …’, although we are told a 
lot about his first wife.) In reading the novel, this particular repetition takes 
on many different moods. It can come across as endearing, funny, irritating 
and sinister. Even the hyphens or dashes themselves, holding the repeated 
phrase apart from the rest of the sentence, can take on a visual meaning, as 
though before ‘the second wife’ were this line, this body, this grave; and after 
it another line, another body.
16. Gabriel Josipovici, The Air We Breathe, reprinted in Steps: Selected Fiction and 
Drama (Manchester: Carcanet, 1990), 357.
17. Wallace Stevens, ‘A Glass of Water’, in The Collected Poems: The Corrected Edition 
(New York: Penguin Random House, 2015), 209.
18. Maurice Blanchot, The Space of Literature, trans. Ann Smock (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska, 1982), 196.
